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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
STATEMENT CONCERNING INTEREST OF 
AMICUS CURIAE IN ISSUES BEFORE THE 
COURT. 
"Underground water in the United States is a 
significant source of an increasingly precious com-
modity; nearly one-fifth of the country's with-
drawal needs were met from underground supplies 
in 1963, and the proportion is expected to reach one-
half in the foreseeable future. In 1960, six and one-
third billion gallons were taken each day from sub-
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surface sources, a consumption double that of a 
scant fifteen years ago." University of Colorado 
Law Review, Volume 40, Number One, Page 133. 
It is axiomatic that underground water is important to 
the development and growth of Utah, to Salt Lake County, 
to those who reside therein, and to the industries and other 
operations which maintain our modern economy. 
Kennecott Copper Corporation, but one example, is a 
corporate resident of Salt Lake County, where it has an 
integrated copper mining industry. To accomplish the nec-
essary mining, leaching, concentrating, smelting and refin-
ing, Kennecott uses about 72,000 gallons of water per min-
ute. There are a number of sources for this water, but ap-
proximately 44 percent comes from the underground water 
basin of Salt Lake County. 
A few years ago, Kennecott processed 90,000 tons of 
ore per day. Now it is treating 18,000 tons more of ore per 
day. With this increased expansion came a need for more 
water. The surface waters of Salt Lake County had been 
fully appropriated, but one significant available source for 
additional water was the ground water basin. If Kennecott 
and all others desiring to utilize the available underground 
water are to do so efficiently, filing proper applications to 
appropriate or Change Applications with the State Engi-
neer, the State Engineer should not be frustrated in his 
administration of the water source in the general public 
interest by court decisions which seem to hold that those 
who have rights to divert water from a ground water basin 
are also entitled to the absolute right to have the hydro-
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static pressure that happened to be present at the time of 
the original appropriation maintained regardless of the 
reasonableness or efficiency of his diversion. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE DISCUSSED 
When the Amicus Curiae Petition was filed seeking 
permission to appear before the Supreme Court in this 
case, three questions were to be discussed as follows: 
(1) Do owners of rights to the use of underground 
water by means of flowing wells have a vested 
right to the hydrostatic pressure in their wells 
such that they can enjoin other owners of rights 
from the same sources from improving their 
methods of diversion if the effect of such im-
provement is to lower the hydrostatic pressure 
in other wells? 
(2) Does the owner of a right to divert and use un-
derground water by means of wells have the 
right under Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 
1953 to alter and change his means or method of 
diversion by equipping the same with pumps, if 
necessary, to continue the full use of his water 
right even though as a result of such alteration 
or change the hydrostatic pressure in other wells 
might be lowered thereby? 
(3) Does an established right to divert water from 
an underground source entitle the owner thereof 
to an unqualified right to the continued artesian 
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pressure as his means of diversion, or is such 
right limited to a means or method of diversion 
which is reasonable and consistent with the state 
of development in the area in which he obtains 
his water? 
An examination of those questions makes it clear that 
there is really but one fundamental question which evolves 
from the three noted above: 
Does an established vested right to divert water 
from an underground source entitle the owner 
thereof to an unqualified right to the continued ar-
tesian pressure as his means of diversion, or is such 
right limited to a means or method of diversion 
which is reasonable and consistent with the state 
of development in the area in which he obtains his 
water? 
ARGUMENT 
AN ESTABLISHED VESTED RIGHT TO DI-
VERT WATER FROM AN UNDERGROUND 
SOURCE IS LIMITED TO A MEANS OR 
METHOD OF DIVERSION WHICH IS REA-
SONABLE AND CONSISTENT WITH THE 
STATE OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA 
IN WHICH ONE OBTAINS HIS WATER. 
Mr. Justice Latimer in the case of Hanson v. Salt Lake 
City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 established the point of 
departure for our argument when he said at page 442: 
"It is my belief that the development of artes-
ian water in this state has reached a point where 
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we should only protect the prior appropriator when 
his means of diversion are reasonable and consist-
ent with the state of development in the area in 
which he obtains his water." 
The thrust of Judge Latimer's opinion was to assert 
that if a highly developed underground water basin is to 
be fully and efficiently developed, the prior appropriator 
should not be entitled absolutely to his hydrostatic pressure. 
In the case of Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, 
9 U.2d 234, 344 P.2d 528, Mr. Justic Crockett discussed 
the problem of maximum development of an underground 
water basin at page 334: 
"The difficulty with preserving to the prior 
user the absolute right to waiter and also to the 
pressure and means of diversion is that projecting 
its application to basins where there are a great 
number of users reveals that it dctes not work to 
serve the necessary purpose of maximum develop-
ment and use of water. The evidence indicates and 
it is a well-known and observable fact, that when 
the water table of an underground basin is main-
tained at a high enough level to sustain pressure in 
flowing wells in the higher areas, there will be 
water above and near the surface in the lower areas 
forming ponds, marshes and swamps. This results 
in wasteful losses from surface evaporation and 
from consumption by water-loving plants, tules, 
reeds and rushes, indigenous to such areas, which 
are of little or no value. There is often further 
wastage from drainage of the basin by streams or 
by leakage and seepage out of it." 
In the case immediately before the Court, we are con-
cerned with the proper interpretation of Section 73-3-3, 
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U.C.A. 1953, and more particularly the first sentence which 
reads as follows: 
"Any person entitled to the use of water may 
change the place of diversion or use and may use 
the water for other purposes than those for which 
it was originally appropriated but no such change 
shall be made if it impairs any vested right without 
just compensation." 
The term "any vested right" is not defined by statute. How-
ever, this Court in three cases (Justesen v. Olsen, 86 Utah 
158, 40 P.2d 802; Hanson v. Salt Lake City, supra; and 
Current Creek Irrigation Co. V. Andrews, supra) has pro-
vided guidance as to what a vested right to underground 
water means. None of those cases involved a Change Ap-
plication under Section 73-3-3, but those cases cannot be 
ignored in reaching a conclusion as to disposal of this 
matter now before the court. 
In searching for a definition of "vested right" as it 
relates to ground water, we must be cognizant that the 
Utah Legislature has provided that all waters in this state, 
whether above or under the ground are declared to be the 
property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the 
use thereof. Section 73-1-1, U.C.A. 1953. This Court has 
held that it is contrary to public policy in Utah to permit 
wa^te of water (Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 U. 50, 59, 40 P.2d 
755) and that conservation of water is of utmost import-
ance to public welfare in Utah (Brian v. Fremont Irrigac-
tion Co., 112 U. 220, 186 P.2d 588). In American Fork 
Irr. Co., et al. V. Linke, et al, 121 U. 90, 97, 239 P.2d 188, 
this Court said: 
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"Plaintiff's proposal, if completed without im-
pairing vested rights, contemplates the more bene-
ficial use of water, a most desired result fully con-
sistent with progress and change, and reflecting the 
established policy of this state." 
Utah's water statutes clearly enjoin upon the State the 
duty to control the appropriation of the public waters in a 
manner that will be for the best interests of the public. 
Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 506, 136 P.2d 957. What 
the Legislature obviously desired was full development and 
beneficial use of the water of Utah with as little waste as 
possible. That would seem to have been and now is the 
basic theory followed by this Court. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the Court in this case should now establish 
clearly the rule of reason applicable to water diversion 
which would allow the fullest and best use of ground water 
in the State of Utah. It seems clear that the Court should 
reject the concept that when one seeks to change his ground 
water right and make the means of diversion more effi-
cient, as the applicant did here, even though the hydro-
static pressure of others who have water rights is lowered 
by such a change, the Change Applicant is absolutely re-
sponsible for replacing the pressure or ceasing operations, 
or acquiring the right so affected. While Kennecott eco-
nomically could meet this requirement, still Utah's basins 
wil not be fully developed for the general public because 
few, if any, such applicants would be able to insure those 
with sudh vested rights the right to have the same pressure 
maintained. The better rule would seem to be that a "vested 
right" to underground water entitles one owning the right 
to use of the water, but nevertheless, the means of diversion 
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must continue to be reasonable and consistent with the 
state of development of water in the area, and not detri-
mental to the overall purpose of putting all of the usable 
water in the basin to use. 
Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water 
Rights in the West, recognized this problem at page 179 
when he stated: 
"On the whole, it seems obvious that to accord 
the first appropriator under a ground-water admin-
istrative statute the right to have the water level 
maintained at the point at which he first pumps it, 
or damages in lieu thereof, so long as there is an 
adequate water supply of equivalent quality avail-
able at lower depths from which it is feasible to 
pump, would unduly complicate the administration 
of waiter rights in the area and might seriously cur-
tail the fullest utilization of the ground-water sup-
ply, for later uses under such a handicap may prove 
to be economically impracticable. This result would 
be out of line with the purpose of the statute. Ac-
cordingly these factors and implications are worthy 
of consideration in determining the question of rea-
sonableness of the first appropriator's diversion un-
der such circumstances." 
A number of western State Legislatures have attempted 
to define "vested right'' as it applies to underground water 
and these statutes should be helpful in view of the fact that 
Utah has no statute defining the term. 
Alaska in 1966 adopted Section 46.15.050 which pro-
vides: 
"Priority of appropriation gives prior right. 
Priority of appropriation does not include the right 
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to prevent changes in the condition of water occur-
rence, such as the increase or decrease of stream 
flow, or the lowering of a water table, artesian pres-
sure, or water level, by later appropriators, if the 
prior appropriator can reasonably acquire his water 
under the changed conditions." 
The State of Colorado: 
". . . declared that the traditional policy of 
the state of Colorado, requiring the water resources 
of this state to be devoted to beneficial use in rea-
sonable amounts through appropriation, is affirmed 
with respect to the designated ground waters of 
this state, as said waters are defined in section 148-
18-2(3). While the doctrine of prior appropriation 
is recognized, such doctrine should be modified to 
permit the full economic development of designated 
ground water resources. Prior appropriations of 
ground water should be protected and reasonable 
ground water pumping levels maintained, but not 
to include the maintenance of historical water lev-
els." 148-18-1, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963. 
Idaho's Legislature stated in Section 42-226, Idaho 
Code, as follows: 
"It is hereby declared that the traditional pol-
icy of the state of Idaho, requiring the water re-
sources of this state to be devoted to beneficM use 
in reasonable amounts through appropriation, is af-
firmed with respect to the ground water resources 
of this state as said term is hereinafter defined: 
and, while the doctrine of 'first in time is first in 
right' is recognized, a reasonable exercise of this 
right shall not block full economic development of 
underground water resources, but early appropria-
tors of underground water shall be protected in the 
maintenance of reasonable ground water pumping 
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levels as may be established by the state reclama-
tion engineer as herein provided." 
Kansas has a detailed guide for its Chief Engineer; 
Section 82a-711 provides: 
"With regard to whether a proposed use will 
impair a use under an existing water right, impair-
ment shall include the unreasonable raising or low-
ering of the static water level or the unreasonable 
increase or decrease of the streamflow or the un-
reasonable deterioration of the water quality at the 
water user's point of diversion beyond a reasonable 
economic limit." 
Section 82a-711a of the Kansas law contains express 
conditions for appropriations as follows: 
"It shall be an express condition of each ap-
propriation of surface or ground water that the 
right of the appropriator shall relate to a specific 
quantity of water and that such right must allow 
for a reasonable raising or lowering of the static 
water level and for the reasonable increase or de-
crease of the streamflow at the appropriator's point 
of diversion: Provided, That in determining such 
reasonable raising or lowering of the static water 
level in a particular area, the chief engineer shall 
consider the economics of diverting or pumping 
water for the water uses involved; and nothing here-
in shall be construed to prevent the granting of per-
mits to applicants later in time on the ground that 
the diversions under such proposed later appropria-
tions may cause the water level to be raised or low-
ered at the point of diversion of a prior appropria-
tor, so long as the rights of holders of existing 
water rights can be satisfied under such express 
conditions." 
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Section 41-141 of the Wyoming Statutes passed in 1957 
is also clear in its limiting conditions: 
"It shall be an express condition of each permit 
and of each appropriation of underground water ac-
quired thereunder that the right of the appropria-
tor does not include the right to have the water 
level of artesian pressure at the appropriator's 
point of diversion maintained at any level higher 
than that required for maximum beneficial use of 
the water in the source of supply. The state engi-
neer may issue any permit subject to such condi-
tions as he may find to be in the public interest." 
In defining a water right in Montana, Section 89-2912 
declares that: 
"Appropriative rights shall relate only to quan-
tities of water for beneficial uses and not to water 
levels, means of use, or ease of withdrawal, . , ." 
Nevada has also recognized that an underground water 
appropriation does not entitle one to the hydrostatic pres-
sure that was present when the water was originally ap-
propriated. Section 534.110, Nevada Revised Statutes, is 
the one to which we direct the Court's attention : 
"4. It shall be an express condition of each 
appropriation of ground water acquired under NRS 
534.010 to 534.190, inclusive, that the right of the 
appropriator shall relate to a specific quantity of 
water and that such right must allow for a reason-
able lowering of the static water level at the ap-
propriator's pqint of diversion. In determining such 
reasonable lowering of the static water level in a 
particular area, the state engineer shall consider 
the economics of pumping water for the general 
type of crops growing and may also consider the 
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effect of water use on the economy of the area in 
general. 
"5. Nothing herein shall be so construed as 
to prevent the granting of permits to applicants 
later in time on the ground that the diversion under 
such proposed later appropriations may cause the 
water level to be lowered at the point of diversion 
of a prior appropriator, so long as the rights of 
holders of existing appropriations can be saMsfied 
under such express conditions." 
All of the above statutes have been noted because such 
legislation clearly indicates that the Western States are 
attempting to provide a rule of reason to achieve full bene-
ficial and efficient development of underground water 
basins. It is significant that each of those States have 
adopted the modern ground water concept as espoused by 
Wells A. Hutchins as far back as 1942. 
The majority in Hanson v. Salt Lake City, supra, at 
page 422 seemed initially to recognize that the means of 
diversion must be reasonable when it was said at page 422: 
"We conclude that the water of artesian basins 
are subject to appropriation in Ithis state and that 
the first appropriator obtains a prior ri^ht to the 
use of such waters over subsequent appropriators, 
and that includes his means of diversion as long as 
such means are reasonably efficient and do not un-
reasonably waste water." 
However, the court then went on to decide that a sub-
sequent appropriator must bear the additional cost of lift-
ing sufficient water to a prior appropriator if the subse-
quent ground water appropriator reduces the static head 
pressure. 
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We submit that the rationale of the judges who con-
curred only in the result in the case of Hanson v. Salt Lake 
City, supra, is more in keeping with maximum development 
of an underground water basin. 
Mr. Justice Wolfe on page 434 commented: 
"I realize that first in time is first in right 
both as to surface and ground waters. But I agree 
with Mr. Justice LATIMER that first in right does 
not mean that antiquated means of diversion is a 
part of that prior right." 
Further on page 436 he said: 
'Trior appropriators by first tapping the basin 
might reap the benefit of a static head sufficient to 
bring the water diverted to the surface, but to re-
quire all subsequent appropriators to preserve this 
means of bringing the water to the surface would be 
to require them to preserve the static head, and 
thereby prevent the widest use of that underground 
water, or introduce impractical problems of allocat-
ing among numerous subsequent appropriators the 
amount of impairment each caused to the static 
head of a prior user or users. I think the tendency 
is, even in truly artesian basins ('artesian' accur-
ately used applies to water which on being tapped, 
naturally rises to the surface although the term is 
loosely used to apply to any area where deep wells 
are drilled and water is pumped) to require all users 
to put in pumps in order to prevent waste." 
Finally, on page 439, let us look at the last paragraph 
of Justice Wolfe's opinion: 
"Naturally when supply is depleted in any ves-
sel large or small, static pressure is lowered. But 
it does not follow that, because the static pressure is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
lowered, the user has been legally injured if he can 
by reasonable means still obtain the amount of wa-
ter he appropriated. Under the policy making as 
much water as possible available for use and en-
couraging its use, he cannot insist that the static 
pressure existing at the time of his appropriation be 
maintained, or that a subsequent appropriator pay 
the cost of pumping apparatus to take the place of 
the lost pressure. He must, as Mr. Justice LATI-
MER states, use that means of transporting water 
to the surface which serves the above policy if un-
der the circumstances and period, and in view of 
the rights of other appropriators, both prior and 
subsequent, it is a reasonable method." 
Judge Latimer's thesis is summarized in the last three 
paragraphs of his opinion at pages 445 and 446: 
"If we are to protect the prior appropriator 
under all circumstances, then the prior appropria-
tor can require damages from every subsequent ap-
propriator and each subsequent appropriator in 
turn, can require damages from all subsequent ap-
propriators, until the last one would have to pay 
tribute to all. If the waters of the Jordan River 
Basin are to be utilized to the fullest extent, then 
it must be recognized that some lowering of the 
water table or static head will result when each wdl 
is drilled; and that such a result cannot be avoided 
if use is to be made of the water now going to waste. 
If the present appropriators of artesian water have 
the right to retain the pressure now present in the 
basin, then I see no escape from the conclusion that 
in the future, it will not be economical and feasible 
to drill wells in this basin. 
"Moreover, unless we adopt the principle that 
prior appropriators must use reasonable means of 
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diversion, I am unable to determine how the State 
Engineer can carry out the functions delegated to 
to him by the 1935 Legislature. He is authorized to 
permit citizens of this state to appropriate unap-
propriated waters and under the evidence of Dr. 
Marsell, there exists a minimum of 165 cubic feet 
per second of unappropriated water in this basin. 
If the State Engineer must require subsequent ap-
propriators to pay tribute to all prior appropriators 
of water in the area, then we cannot reasonably ex-
pect newcomers to assume this burden. 
"The record does not convince me that the 
method of diversion used by the plaintiff in this 
case is reasonable under the facts and circum-
stances. I, therefore, feel that the cost of making 
his diversion reasonable should be borne by him and 
not by the city. He should be protected in the quan-
tity of water he has appropriated and is beneficially 
using, but I believe that even though his original 
means of diversion may have been reasonable, it 
now should be changed to one consistent with the 
developments in the area, and that he should be 
required to assume the additional costs imposed on 
him by virtue of the changed conditions." 
In 1959 the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Current 
Creek Irrigation Co, v. Andreivs, supra, considered the 
problem of whether or not prior appropriators from an 
underground basin have a vested right to continue receiv-
ing water by artesian pressure and whether subsequent 
appropriators Whose withdrawals of water lower the water 
table and reduce the flow of prior wells, must restore the 
pressure or bear the expense of replacing the water of prior 
appropriators. The majority ruled that a subsequent ap-
propriator of underground water whose withdrawals in-
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terfered with prior appropriators would have to cease 
pumping or replace the water of prior appropriators. In 
dissenting, Mr. Justice Crockett pointed out that the ma-
jority was assuming that a prior user of underground 
water has an absolute right to have not only the water, but 
also to have the pressure and means of diversion preserved 
inviolate. He asserted that inasmuch as water rights are 
assured and protected by the authority of the state, it is 
logical and necessary that they be deemed to be held subject 
to such conditions and limitations as are established by 
law for the general good. Of particular significance is 
Justice Crockett's comments with respect to the Hanson v. 
Salt Lake City, supra, case at page 337: 
"It is of vital significance, insofar as the au-
thority of the Hanson case is concerned, that Jus-
tice Wolfe and Latimer in concurring opinions 
pointed out that prior appropriators of underground 
water should not be deemed to get an absolute right 
to pressure, but only to the water; and that the 
means of diversion must be reasonable and consist-
ent with the state of development of water in the 
area and not inimical to the overall purpose of put-
ting all of the usable water in the basin to use. In 
a special concurrence in the result, Chief Justice 
Pratt in different words concurred with that con-
clusion saying, 'The rule as to reasonable and eco-
nomical use of water applies as well to methods of 
diversion as it does to the application of the water 
to the land itself/ These observations were made in 
apprehension of the very problems that have arisen 
in this case. As I view it, they are not inconsistent 
with the statute and are in conformity with the 
basic objective which must necessarily underlie our 
water law." 
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The Colorado Supreme Court in the case of the City 
of Colorado Springs V. Bender, 366 P.2d 552 (1961) which 
involved an action by senior appropriators of water from 
an underground stream to enjoin junior appropriator from 
withdrawing water, provides guidance at page 555: 
"At his own point of diversion on a natural 
water course, each diverter must establish some rea-
sonable means of effectuating his diversion. He is 
not entitled to command the whole or a substantial 
flow of the stream merely to facilitate his taking 
the fraction of the whole flow to which he is en-
titled. Schodde V. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 
224 U.S. 107, 119, 32 S.Ct. 470, 56 L.ed. 686. This 
principle applied to diversion of underflow or un-
derground water means that priority of appropria-
tion does not give a right to an inefficient means of 
diversion, such as a well which reaches to such a 
shallow depth into the available water supply that 
a shortage would occur to such senior even though 
diversion by others did not deplete the stream be-
low where there would be an adequate supply for 
the senior's lawful demand." 
In discussing what should be done by the trial court on 
remand, the Colorado Supreme Court at page 556 said: 
"The court must determine what, if anything, 
the plaintiffs should be required to do to make more 
efficient the facilities at their point of diversion, 
due regard being given to the purposes for which 
the appropriation had been made and the 'economic 
reach/ of plaintiffs. The plaintiffs cannot reason-
ably 'command the whole' source of supply merely 
to facilitate the taking by them of the fraction of 
the entire flow to which their senior appropriation 
entitles them. On the dther hand, plaintiffs cannot 
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be required to improve their extraction facilities 
beyond their economic reach upon a consideration 
of all the factors involved." 
If it is necessary in the decision of this case or in de-
fining what is a "vested right" as it appears in Section 
73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, the Utah Supreme 
Court should not hesitate on this narrow point to reverse 
Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, supra. Certainly, 
the decisions of this Court in the past make it clear that 
the Utah Court has properly adjusted the rules of law to 
meet arising problems and modern developments pertaining 
to use of water in Utah. In the early decisions, the Supreme 
Court followed the common law concept of absolute owner-
ship of ground water by the overlying landowner. Willow 
Creek Irr. Co. V. Michaelson, 21 U. 248, 60 P. 943 (1900). 
In Home V. Utah Oil Refining Co., 59 Utah 279, 202 P. 815 
(1921), the ownership rule was abandoned in favor of the 
doctrine of correlative rights. Shortly thereafter, in Glover 
V. Utah Oil Refinery Co., 62 Utah 174, 218 P. 955 (1923) 
the Court modified the correlative right doctrine to allow 
an owner to transport his proportionate share of the water 
out of the basin. In 1935, the correlative rights doctrine 
was rejected by the court in two decisions (Wrathall V. 
Johnson, 86 U. 50, 40 P.2d 744 (1935) and Justesen V. 
Olsen, 86 U. 158, 40 P.2d 802 (1935)) which adopted in 
its place the doctrine of prior appropriation. 
So we respectfully submit that the Utah Supreme 
Court should now adopt the rule of law which would define 
"vested right" in Section 73-3-3 as meaning that while an 
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appropriator of underground water is entitled to the quan-
tity of water that he diverts and beneficially uses, never-
theless, his means of diversion must continue to be reason-
able and consistent with the development of the area. No 
longer should an appropriator of underground water be en-
titled absolutely and unreasonably to maintenance of the 
hydrostatic or artesian pressure that happened to exist at 
the time of his original appropriation. 
CONCLUSION 
Maximum beneficial use of available water should be 
the guiding policy in defining rights to the use thereof. An 
appropriative, usufructuary right should be defined in 
terms which would permit further appropriations or change 
applications for appropriations to the fullest extent possi-
ble within the safe yield of an underground source so long 
as the pumping lift is economically reasonable. Utah Law 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, Page 192. 
This Court should now take advantage of the oppor-
tunity to adopt the rule of reasonableness in the area here 
involved Which would result in the greatest development 
of underground water basins in Utah and the most bene-
ficial use of the waters contained therein in the public in-
terest. The State Engineer needs guidance which will allow 
him to administer the water laws of Utah so as to obtain 
the highest and best use of the waters of Utah. The rule 
of reasonableness which is in harmony with the opinions 
of Justices Crockett, Wolfe and Latimer, as noted above, 
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should now be adopted by this Court, and the trial court's 
decision in this matter should be reversed with appropriate 
instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE and 
JAMES B. LEE 
of 
Parsons, Behle, Evans & Latimer 
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper 
Corporation 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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